Development expenditures and the local financing constraint by Agbonyitor, Albert D. K.
AJ5  9  Iqo1
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1907
Development  Expenditures  The inadequacy cf loca$  funds
is a major  financing  problem
and the Local Financing  in mostlow-incomie
Con  strait *economies.  It is undercutting
the  absorption  of aid anc  .he
sustainability  of deveiopment




















































































































d|  POIICY  RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1907
Summary  findings
Focusing on the local financing constraint sheds new  funds are more valuable than project aid, at the margin
light on issues of aid, fiscal reform, and the management  - and it becomes important to reallocate local funds, to
of public spending.  leverage project aid, and to raise the quality of
The fungibility of aid need not translate into resource  investment projects.
flows to fill the local financing gap. Indeed, project aid  A persistent gap in local financing complicates
can widen the local financing gap. To augment direct  programs of fiscal reform. For such programs to be
local financing of development, aid must be nonproject  effective, the local financing gap has to be confronted
aid that can generate local currency. In the longer term,  directly by matching planned local fund expenditures
project aid's effect on local financing lies in its impact on  against expected local fund receipts. This requires a
growth and on expanding the hase for tax revenues,  transparent  database to develop indicators and to
seigniorage, and borrowing.  monitor the allocation and use of local resources.
When inadequate local financing limits project
implementation and effective use of aid, local currency
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Development Expenditures and The
Local Financing Constraint 1
Inadequacy  of local  financing  has been  a major development  financing  problem  in
most low income economies,  and is cited as a major factor undercutting  aid
absorption  and "sustainability"  of development  projects.  When inadequate  local
financing  limits  project  implementation  and effective  aid absorption,  it means  that
local currency  funds are more  valuable  than project aid at the margin. Allocating
local funds  to leverage  project  aid resources  becomes  critical  for aid productivity.
Project  screening  and reviews  of development  expenditure  programs  need to pay
as much attention  to assessing  the quality of projects financed fully by  local
funds,  as those  which  are aided.  Resource  shifts from fully  locally-funded  projects
that  enhance  the overall  quality  of public  investments  should  be emphasized.
A fiscal adjustment  program focused on matching aggregate  resources  against
aggregate  expenditures,  while glossing  inner  local financing  imbalances,  stands  to
undercut  the execution  of the development  expenditure  program  and to frustrate
observance  of other  fiscal and financial  benchmarks. A feasible  program  has to
face the local gap directly by matching  planned local fund spending against
expected  local fund receipts,  and ensuring  that planned  development  expenditures
have adequate  matching  funds. Improving  the local financing  data base  will help
to develop  indicators  to monitor  budgeting  for and using  local funds efficiently.
Since economic  growth  provides  scope  to mobilize local funds by expanding  the
base  for tax revenues,  seigniorage  and domestic  borrowing,  fiscal  reforms  need to
protect  high  quality  expenditure  programs  that expand  the base for growth.
I.  The Importance of Local Funds
1.  For most low income economies, while external aid is instrumental for having
access to capital for investment and growth, local funds are indispensable for facilitating
the  absorption of  the aid and  for ensuring that  it  is utilized productively.  Yet,  the
inadequacy of local financing has been a major development financing problem over the
past decades.2  Inadequate local financing has been an important factor, though not the
only one, undercutting the "sustainability" of development projects; weaknesses in local
financing were cited in over 60 percent of Bank projects identified as unsustainable in
1994 (World Bank, 1994a, 1995).  A typical symptom of the local financing problem is
the under-financing of recurrent costs. This is manifested in an inability to pay and retain
skilled personnel; failure to maintain basic social and economic infrastructure; disrepair
of equipment; and shortage of supplies to deliver services from projects, such as schools,
health  facilities,  and  agricultural  extension schemes  (Peter Heller,  1974;  Uma  Lele,
1975).  Another symptom of the local fund problem is a lack of matching fumds  even for
high quality  aided projects.  This  limits aid absorption  and  capital formation,  and  it
Helpful  comments  and  suggestions  were  received  from  Peter  Miovic  and  Giovanna  Prennushi  on  an earlier  draft  of
this  paper.  The  views  expressed  are  the  responsibility  of the author.
The  local  funds  for  budget  finance  comprise  tax revenues;  domestic  borrowing  from  the bank  and  nonbank  public;
money  printing;  use  of reserves;  and  various  types  of  non-project  aid,  such  as commodity  aid,  program  loans  and
cash  grants,  that  generate  local  currency  counterpart  funds.3
contributes to delayed execution of projects. Various degrees of matching fund problems
were experienced in 40 different LDCs in 1991 (World Bank,  1992).  Local financing
shortages  also  undermine  steady macroeconomic management  as governments find  it
difficult to  restrain  expenditures  in  line with prudent fiscal  and financial policies.  In
addition, growing pressure  on aid resources has added to concerns in the development
community  about the  need  for the  low  income economies  to  mobilize greater  local
financing support and, thereby, assume greater ownership for their development.
2.  This paper approaches the local financing constraint problem from a macro-fiscal
perspective:  What is  the  nature  of  the local financing  problem?  What are  its  main
underlying factors?  Does aid necessarily relieve the local financing gap?  What are the
implications, if any, of the local financing gap for fiscal adjustment? The paper explores
answers to these questions.  The next section reviews briefly the recent literature on local
financing.  Section III  formulates  a simple three-gap model that links local  financing
with development expenditure management.  Section IV examines aid fungibility relative
to local funds.  Section V discusses local financing and economic growtI.  Section VI
presents country illustrations; the last section presents conclusions.
II. Historical Overview
3.  The  local financing  problem is  closely linked with  the role of government  in
economic development.  Much of the main stream economic development literature and
the vision of modernization in most of the developing world from the 1950s to the 1970s
assigned  a major role to the  state in  promoting economic development.  Tony  Killick
(1978) illustrated this  contention convincingly with his analysis of development policy
and its implementation in Ghana. The pressures on government to promote growth arose
from  the  expectation  of  quick  improvement  in  living  conditions  imparted  by
independence  movements;  the  "demonstration effect"  of  high  living standards  in  the
industrialized countries; and the political acceptance of a role for the state in providing
basic  social  and  economic  services (Martin and  Lewis,  1956; Musgrave,  1969).  As
government  activities  expanded,  recurrent  cost  under-financing  and  local  financing
constraint problems gained prominence in the 1970s and 1980s from the works of Peter
Heller (1974,  1975, 1979), Mead Over (1981), Club du Sahel (1980), and A. Jennings
(1983).  Heller  attributed  recurrent  cost under-financing to: long  gestation period  of
investments and low growth response to government stimulation; low tax effort; and  a
bias in aid giving for new capital formation.  Mead Over added that surprises, such as
unexpected decline in revenues, increases in input costs, changes in government priorities
and shifts in input supply conditions, worsened the recurrent cost problem. These factors
were compounded by shortcomings in project design, manifested in failure to mobilize
beneficiaries and organize efficient cost recovery systems (Uma Lele, 1975, 1979).
4.  While lessons from development experience and changes in the world system in
recent decades have led to new policies stressing minimal government intrusion in the
economy,  government  remains  an  important partner  in  development, nevertheless  (J.
Stiglitz, 1997).  In addition, while aid agencies now provide assistance, which augments
local funds, local financing problems persist.  This will remain so for some time, in view4
of the generally accepted, even if minimal, role for government in promoting economic
development by investing in the activities which the private sector would not otherwise
undertake.  Such  activities  tend  to  use  labor  and  local  funds  intensively:  rural
infrastructure; rural health  service; environmental  quality; education  and  diffusion  of
technological knowledge; and an effective system of public administration.
III. Development Spending and Local Funds
5.  This section builds on the conventional national income accounts framework to
formulate a three-gap model for examining the nature of the local  financing gap.  Eql
expresses a familiar identity: (G-T) is the fiscal deficit; G is government expenditure;  T
is revenue;  Sp and Ip represent private  savings and  private investments  respectively;
(M-E) is the current account balance; M represents imports, and E is exports.
(G-T)  = (Sp-Ip)  + (M-E)  Eql
6.  Eql  provides a  basis  for the  "two-gap"  thesis;  it envisages  the  economy as
constrained by  a savings-investment gap  and  a foreign financing  gap  (Chennery and
Strout, 1966). Given a growth target, if internal savings were to constrain investments, or
if the trade gap were to limit imports required for production, foreign aid will, in each
case, bridge  the  financing  gap  and help  to  accelerate  economic  growth.  While  the
proponents of the two-gap model were aware of other constraints on economic growth,
the model was focused on the foreign financing gap, and was applied in quantifying the
foreign resource requirements for achieving planned growth targets in the LDCs.
7.  Various critics have queried the two-gap thesis.  J. C. Fei  and G. Ranis  (1968),
and  H. Bruton  (1969) questioned its theoretical basis  and empirical  relevance.  They
queried the conceptual distinction between the two gaps as well as the meaning of the aid
requirements for growth that  the model  generated. They contended  that  aid, without
policy reforms, could perpetuate the financing gaps and impede growth.  More recently,
C. Burnside and D. Dollar (1997) also raised doubt about the effectiveness of aid; they
argue that good policies  - particularly good fiscal, monetary and  trade policies  - are
critical to have the desired impact of aid on economic growth. Willaim Easterly (1997)
traced  the evolution of  the  financing gap  idea:  from  Harrod-Domar's  concept  of the
incremental capital output ratio (ICOR), to Rostow's stages of growth, to Chennery and
Strout, and to others.  Easterly raised doubts about the empirical validity of the ICOR
concept that underlies the two-gap thesis.  In addition, according to Lance Taylor (1993),
the two-gap model does not convey the nature of the development financing problems of
the LDCs. He proposed that at least a third gap, the fiscal gap, should be added to the
two-gap model to account for the "linked fiscal and foreign transfer limitations" on policy
reform and development financing plaguing the LDCs today.
8.  The advocates as well as critics of the two-gap thesis glossed over the importance
of the local resource gap, though they were aware of the problem.  Chennery and Strout,
for example, discussed the limits to aid absorption and aid productivity posed by factors,
such  as  education  and  skills,  an  efficient  public  administration,  and  an  effective5
institutional organization.  They were cognizant that redressing these constraints required
sustained internal resource support; however, in application, the two-gap model glossed
over the importance of local funds for the execution of projects and for the overall sound
economic  management that  is  critical for  growth.  Similarly, while  Taylor  was  fully
cognizant of the import of the fiscal gap, presumption of aid fungibility may have led him
to overlook the inner local financing gap that is embedded in the current fiscal gap.  (This
issue of aid fungibility will be examined later in section IV).
9.  The rest of this section formulates a three-gap model for exploring local financing
issues.  Eq2 is derived from Eql  by defining G as the sum of development expenditure
(Gd) and recurrent expenditure (Gr). In Eq2, development expenditure is presented as a
counterpart of three financing gaps: (a) the current fiscal gap; (b) the savings-investment
gap; and (c) the current account deficit. Since completed development projects have to be
maintained and operated, recurrent cost expenditure, Gr, reflects the past levels of Gd.
Given revenues and other things the same, increasing Gd will eventually cause the current
fiscal deficit, (T-Gr), to widen.  Eq3 shows the financing sources of Gd: the current fiscal
balance (T-Gr); money printing (MP); use of reserves (UR); domestic borrowing (Bd);
local counterpart currency obtained from non-project aid (An); and project aid (FF).  Eq4
simplifies Eq3 as the sum of local funds (LF) and foreign fimds (FF).  In Eq4, LF has
domestic resource components and an aid component, An. FF is project aid.
Gd  = (T-Gr)+(Sp-Ip)+(M-E)  Eq2
Gd  = [(T-Gr)+MP+UR+Bd+An ]+FF  Eq3
Gd  = LF  + FF  Eq4
10.  From Eq2,  both  private  and public  sector  investments are necessary  to  foster
economic growth.  For example, education infrastructure helps to create skills needed to
complement  private  investment activities.  From Eq2,  (T-Gr)>O provides  a  recurrent
surplus to  finance  development by  providing  matching  funds for  aided  projects  and
supporting fully government-funded projects.  The implementation of aided projects as
well as fully government funded projects will be difficult if the current surplus is less
than the local matching funds required by the projects. (T-Gr)<O  means an inability to
cover recurrent costs from internal revenues, let alone support project implementation.
11  In the short term, there is no direct causality between the current fiscal gap and
investment in  development projects. Increased  financing for development activity  can
result from increased private savings as well as lower private investments; from various
sources of local funds, including seigniorage, as indicated in Eq3; and from "turnkey"
projects, which are executed directly by donors without local matching funds. While high
social aspirations often make development expenditure plans exceed expected resources
ex ante, an ex post accounting balance is always obtained between the demand for local
funds and supply.  Most often, this balance is obtained at the cost of reduced quality and
quantity of government services, or more indebtedness. The need for fiscal stability and a
prudent debt service burden limit dependence on the various local financing sources.6
12.  There is an important distinction between the two-gap and three-gap models, with
respect to  the  role of aid.  In the two-gap  thesis, foreign  financing would relax  the
savings-investment constraint or the trade constraint on growth.  In the three-gap thesis
with a local firnancing  constraint, aid will not necessarily bridge the current fiscal gap or
local financing gap; in fact, project aid may widen the local financing gap. The issue here
is not merely the critique that aid without policy reform and adjustment may result in a
chronic  savings-investment gap  and  external deficit, or that without  economic policy
reform aid will not be effective in promoting economic growth (Bruton, 1969; Burnside
and Craig, 1997).  The point is that project aid can widen the local gap by adding to the
matching funds needed to execute the project as well as to the recurrent cost financing
required to operate it on completion.  For aid to fill the local gap directly, it has to be in
the form  of a non-project  aid that generates local currency counterpart funds.  In  the
longer term, aid would relax the local financing constraint provided it promotes growth
and expands the base for mobilizing revenues; for this aid productivity is critical.
13.  To illustrate some implications of the local financing constraint, let Gdc in Eq5
represent the resource allocation  function for development activity.  Assume matching
fund requirements, such that on average "b" units of local funds are required to leverage
"a" units of project aid. Thus, development activity is constrained by the lesser of LF and
FF.  (In a  complex framework,  "a" and "b" would represent vectors  of aid leverage
coefficients for the sectors, such as health, education, agriculture, and road transport).
Gdc  = F {Minimum (bLF,  aFF)}  Eq5
14  From Eq5, let LFu be the binding financing constraint (that is, aFF>bLF), and let
FFu be the complement of LFu.  Then the amount of FF that is actually used would be
(b/a)LFu, where (b/a) is the matching fund ratio or aid leverage ratio.  Therefore, project
aid equivalent ito  ((FF-(b/a)LFu) will not be absorbed.  The extra LF required to  absorb
the unutilized project aid is ((FF-(b/a)LFu))l/b.  To illustrate with a stylized numerical
example in millions of dollars, let Gr = 800, T = 780, MP = 31, An = 10, and FF = 500;  a
= 1, and b = 10. For simplicity, net domestic borrowing and use of reserves are presumed
to be zero.  LFu is 21 (from T+MP+An-Gr); this is lower than the 50 required to absorb
all FF.  Since b/a is 10, the FFu that corresponds to LFu is 210; project aid of 290 will be
unused.  The additional LF needed to absorb all project aid is 29, that is, US$ 29 million.
15.  It  is  important to  point  out  that  reducing the  matching  fund  requirement  or
eliminating it will not redress the local financing problem in a sustained manner.  Such an
action will expand projects funded fully from aid and raise aid dependence. The resulting
faster  pace  of  investments  will  build more  pressure for  recurrent  cost  financing  for
maintenance and operating costs. This means (in terms of Eq2 and Eq3) that Gr will rise;
the  current  fiscal  gap  will  widen,  and  the  local  financing  balance  will  worsen,
undermining utilization of investments as well as growth (Deverajan, et al, 1996).
16.  The fiscal authorities may respond to the local  financing imbalance in various
ways. They may limit project  implementation so that not all FF will be utilized, or they7
may utilize all FF by employing sources of local funds that pose risks to macroeconomic
stability.  To illustrate, assume that expanded seigniorage is used to obtain  additional
local funds.  Take an economy with a GDP of about US$ 7 billion (e.g., Ghana).  Let the
growth rate  be 4.5 percent; the  average currency to GDP ratio is 6.5 percent; income
elasticity of money demand is 1.5. Then the seigniorage rate of 0.44 percent of GDP will
provide local currency equivalent of US$ 31 million, a growth in currency of 7 percent. 3
Generating the additional matching funds of US$ 29 million to  absorb the remaining
unused project aid discussed earlier would mean an extra seigniorage of 0.41 percent of
GDP, an  additional currency growth of 6.5 percent.  Typically in  an LDC, where the
market for treasury bills outside the banking sector is limited, the seigniorage will take
the form of treasury bills being held by the central bank, which is the lender of last resort
to  the  government.  If  the  initial  seigniorage  rate  was  consistent  with  stable
macroeconomic policies, then the higher seigniorage that absorbs all project aid will risk
macroeconomic  stability. In  addition, expanded seigniorage, with  inflation, will  have
adverse impact on tax revenue and overall local fund mobilization (Easterly, et al, 1995).
17.  The main point to be emphasized is that a budgeting process, which focuses on
matching aggregate expenditure plans against aggregate resources and glosses over the
inner local financing constraint will risk the implementation of development expenditures
as well  as adherence to a stable macro-fiscal stance.  A mismatch between local fund
availability and demand will make it difficult to implement the development budget and
also observe prudent fiscal and financial targets.  To minimize this, the fiscal authorities
must assess the local fund balance explicitly by matching planned local fund expenditures
against local fund receipts to ensure that the overall local financing budget is coherent.
IV. Foreign Aid and Local Financing.
18.  The main issue here is aid fungibility in the context  of local financing, that is,
whether  or  not  aid  fungibility would  help  to  mitigate  the  local  financing  gap.  To
emphasize, the issue is not the  on-going debate in the development community about
whether or not aid is fungible, and what the implications of such fungibility may be for
project financing.  In the context of a local financing gap, even if project aid is shown to
be fungible,  there is still an issue as to whether or not  such fungibility translates into
resource flows to redress the local financing gap.  Various  scenarios of aid fungibility
may be envisaged.  First, perfect aid fungibility would mean (i) that aid replaces activities
the  government  would  have  financed  with  own  resources  anyway,  and  (ii)  that
government has flexibility to  convert project aid to non-project  aid, depending on the
For illustration purposes only, the seigniorage rate is defned  simply as the product of GDP growth (4.5),
the elasticity of money demand (1.5), and currency to GDP ratio (6.5).  Local currency obtained equals the
seigniorage rate multiplied by total GDP of US$ 7 billion.  Based on the currency to GDP ratio of 6.5, total
currency is US$ 455 million. Therefore, the local funds of US$ 31 million obtained from  seigniorage is
equivalent to 7 percent growth in currency.  Seigniorage will be lower if the substitution effects of money
demand relative to inflation, interest rates and exchange rates are considered.  See Adams, et al. 1996.8
perceived budgetary resource constraint. Under these conditions, the local financing gap
would not be distinguished from the foreign financing gap; the concern would be with the
total resource gap.  In reality, LDCs often have project aid which they are not able to
absorb because of inadequate complementary local resources.
19.  Second, aid fungibility may be reflected in a  shift of resources to  increase the
holding of external assets or meet debt service obligations.  In this case, the impact of
fungibility would not be reflected on development spending.  Third, even if project aid is
fungible among sectors, such project aid may, nevertheless, widen the local financing gap
in the short to medium term because of the related matching funds as well as recurrent
cost financing requirements.  This would be more so for countries which do not generate
own resources to finance development expenditures, and would not have any sustained
public investments without aid.  However, in the longer term, aid may help to narrow the
local financing gap through its impact on growth and on the tax revenue base.
20.  The empirical evidence indicates some aid fungibility, but this  is complex.  H.
Park and J. R. Park (1990, 1992) found positive impact of aid on local fund mobilization
in  Indonesia, but  not  in  the  Dominican Republic.  In  the latter, aid  fungibility was
reflected  in  reduced  revenues  and  shifts  from  development  expenditures  to  deficit
reduction  and  debt  service.  In  the former,  there  was  virtually no  indication  of  aid
fungibility. Aid stimulated both revenues and total expenditures. There was no indication
of resource  diversion from  sectors  such as  industry,  tourism,  mining, electricity  and
transport.  Moreover, aid fostered local resource flows to  sectors, such as agriculture,
education, health, water supply and housing.  These results reflected Indonesia's  strong
growth and enhanced revenue capacity, and the emphasis on limiting aid dependence.
21.  In other cases, Victor Levy (1988) and Peter Boone (1994, 1996) found that aid
fungibility promoted consumption rather than investment and growth in the developing
countries.  An exception is in a few low income countries where average annual aid is
generally more than 15 percent of GDP.  Fungibility was found to be less in low income
countries  where  much  of the  aid  is  project  finance.  The  overall  impacf  of aid  on
investment finance and growth was found to depend on the commitment of the political
elite to development.  Some of these results obtained by Levy and Boone  suffer from
inadequate  distinction  between  public  consumption  and  recurrent  expenditures.  For
example, expenditures on education and health, which are mostly recurrent, are typically
classified as consumption, though they enhance the quality of human capital and are as
critical for growth as physical capital.  More recently, Swaroop and Zhu  (1996) found
from a sample of developing countries that concessional aid for education was partially
fungible, while concessional aid for transport and communication was not.4
22.  Overall, the empirical literature confirms aid fungibility generally; however, this
does  not  necessarily  translate  into  resource  flows  to  enhance  local  financing.  The
4For  exarnple,  a dollar  of concessional  aid to agriculture,  education  and energy  was  found to have  resulted
in increase  of US$ 0.11,  US$ 0.49,  and US$  0.36 for each of the sectors.9
importance of fungibility for local financing varies by sector; it depends on the size of aid
relative to the economy and on the attitude of the ruling elite towards economic growth
and development (Schmidt-Hebbel et al., 1996).  Aid fungibility may result in resource
shifts away from sectors, such as education, which use local funds intensively. In the case
of Indonesia, where there is no evidence of fungibility, there was strong emphasis on
local resource mobilization to complement aid finance in the identified priority sectors.
Reducing the local fund gap and raising aid productivity require government commitment
to development, based on mobilizing internal resources to complement aid resources.
V. Discussion  and Analysis:  Growth and Local Funds
23.  This  section uses a simple macroeconomic framework (Appendix A) to examine
the interaction among selected policies, local financing and economic growth.  Figure 1,
based  on  the  framework,  brings  the  discussion together  in  the context  of  two  main
variables, namely, national income (Y) and the real exchange rate (e), where e is the local
currency value of foreign exchange in constant price terms. The framework comprises
supply and demand functions for (i) output, (ii) local funds, (iii) foreign funds, and (iv)
money.  These  relations  are  arranged to  obtain  equilibrium  curves for  output,  local
financing and foreign financing in the context of Y and e as shown in Figure 1.
24.  The  yy  (or yoyo)  curve  in  Figure  1, representing  output demand  and  supply
equilibrium,  is upward sloping.  Exchange rate reforms are expected to  contribute to
stimulating  growth through,  for example, (i) greater aid inflow to support investments
and  (ii) raising exports  by  correcting for price distortions, resource misallocation and
under-employment that are normally inherent to over-valued exchange rate regimes.  In
this framework, only the nominal exchange rate, E, is determined by policy directly. The
real exchange rate, e, is determined endogenously by price movements.
25.  The ff (or fofo) curve in Figure 1 represents foreign financing demand and supply
balance.  As shown in Appendix A, ff may be upward or downward sloping, depending
on the final outcome of the effects of output and real money growth on imports. If money
demand growth raises import demand, then it will reinforce the impact of output growth
on import demand.  The overall effect would raise demand for foreign financing, and ff
will be upward sloping.  If, on the other hand, money demand growth results  in lower
demand for foreign currency, and if this dominates the effect of income growth on import
demand, then real money demand growth from output growth will dampen demand for
foreign financing, and e will have to decline to have foreign financing balance; the ff
curve will be downward sloping and will be more elastic than the 11  curve.  Figure  1 is
based on the upward sloping ff case. The reader may analyze the other case.
26.  The  11 (or lolo)  curve  in  Figure  1 represents local  fund  supply  and  demand
balances  for various combinations  of Y and e. Output  increase from expanding  local
financing through seigniorage or domestic credit would affect foreign reserves.  A higher




financing)  by the  govermnent, and return to  the 11  curve. A  change in  output would
involve an inverse change of the real exchange rate to have local financing balance.
27.  In Figure  1, from an initial equilibrium at "a," (lol,  yoyo, and fofo) suppose that
government expands domestic credit to  provide matching funds  and implement  aided
projects, or to  finance operation and maintenance and generate output from completed
projects.  The  effect  on  output  may  be  transmitted  through  investment  in  basic
infrastructure, or improved human resource services and higher quality of the work force,
which  complements private  investments. 5 These activities  could stimulate  growth  by
raising productivity  and  making output  supply price  competitive.  To  illustrate  with
Figure 1, from "a", the initial effect of the expanded local expenditure is a shift in lolo to
11;  this would harness available project aid resources.  In addition, expanded domestic
credit would  spill-over onto  demand for foreign goods and  shift  fofo to  ff.  Higher
demand for output will cause output price to rise.  The output price increases will have to
be lower than the proportionate increase in the nominal exchange rate, leaving the final
real exchange rate higher than initially.  Output response to the competitive supply price
and the higher real exchange rate will shift yoyo to yy to a new equilibrium at "z."
28.  Economic growth is critical for the stability of the new equilibrium at "z." If there
were no output response, then the increase in e induced by the increase in the nominal
exchange rate, E, will be eroded by price increases, and 11  will drift back to  the initial
output level  yo  corresponding to  lolo. Another round of  local fund  increases will  be
needed to raise expenditure, leading to a new round of inflation and so on. The need for
growth to have stability is independent of the method used to finance the expansion in
local expenditures.  If  tax revenues were  employed to  support the  increase in  local
expenditures, the tax increase will dampen private demand for imports and circumscribe
the extent of real exchange rate adjustment. However, lack of growth response will mean
periodic tax increases from the same tax base to sustain the higher local expenditures.
Since  the  output  stagnation implies  that  government  expenditures  are  less  efficient
relative to the private sector, maintaining the expenditure at 11  will create a heavy tax
burden and frustrate growth even more.  If the shift from lolo to 11  were financed  from
local  funds  obtained  from non-project  aid, then  without  growth,  maintaining  11 will
require an  open-ended commitment to  providing  the required  non-project  aid.  This
means more and more aid dependence to support local financing, and more debt burden.
29.  Growth is critical to overcome the local financing gap in a sustained manner. The
growth  is  essential  to  expand the  base  for  local  resource  mobilization  through  tax
revenues, seigniorage and domestic borrowing  Underlying the growth emphasis is the
presumption of an effective public investment screening process, so that development
expenditures  can  generate high  rates  of  return.  In  other  words,  fiscal  adjustnent
programs have to protect the financing of high quality projects which can contribute to
5 A  most  recent  study (Deverajan,  et al,  1996)  provides  a  summary  of  the  literature  on  government
expenditures  and growth, and  presents new findings  on  channels through  which  sector  recurrent
expenditure  shares  (e.g., preventive  health and  subsidiary  services  to education)  influence  growth.12
growth.  One cannot overstate the central importance of growth promotion and growth-
oriented policies for addressing local financing problems.
30.  The conclusion about the importance of economic growth  for mobilizing local
funds from tax and seigniorage is equally relevant for domestic borrowing, though this is
not  modeled  explicitly  in  the  framework  summarized  in  Appendix  A.  While  a
competitive banking system and sound macroeconomic and financial policies are key to
using  domestic borrowing to  augment local funds, in the long term,  a sustainable debt
burden requires economic growth.  To finance the public deficit in a sustained manner in
the long run, the conventional wisdom is for demand for borrowing to maintain a constant
ratio of debt stock to GDP at the existing real interest  rates.  Growth is essential for
sustainable borrowing, given inflation, real interest rates, and ratio of debt to GDP.
VI Country  Illustrations
31.  Fiscal authorities in the LDCs, conversant with the impact of local fund shortages
on  development  management,  explicitly  identify  both  the  aid  as  well  as  the  local
financing requirements for implementing public investment programs.  This is the case,
for example, in Tanzania's Forward Rolling Budget Plan, and similarly for the public
investment programs for Bangladesh and Nepal, to mention only a few.  However, since
countries facing a persistent local financing gap often have associated macroeconomic
instability,  stabilization policies  (for  example, to  adjust  government  outlays,  money
growth,  inflation and interest rates) often tend to  heighten local  fund  shortages.  For
example,  Sub-Saharan African countries  experienced  decline  in  local  funds through
reduced  seigniorage between  1981-86 and  1990-91 with the spread  in the adoption of
stabilization programs.  During these periods, average seigniorage rates in proportion to
GDP fell from 1.6 to 1.3 percent for low income countries; 0.8 to 0.3 percent for middle
income countries; and from one to zero percent for countries with  fixed exchange rates.
In Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania, the reduction in seigniorage was due mainly to reduced
real money growth (Adams, et al, 1996).  The initial phase of reforms  was marked by
reduced delivery of social services and inadequate maintenance of infrastructure assets.
32.  Though there were no coherent programs focused on redressing  local financing
problems  directly, country  experiences show  differences  in  the  exact  nature  of  the
problem.  In Kenya, for example, the tax to  GDP ratio was already  high  at over 25
percent of GDP; thus key reforms focused on reducing the size of government, including
the parastatal sector; limiting the excessive government wage bill  and restructuring the
financial  sector to  reduce  high  interest rate  premium  on government  borrowing.  In
Tanzania and Ghana, on the other hand, tax reforms  to mobilize more revenues were
central to the fiscal adjustment effort. Other measures focused on rationalizing the civil
service,  streamlining development projects,  and restructuring the  financial institutions
which  were unable to mobilize and  allocate financial savings effectively. In addition,
access to non-project aid augmented the supply of local funds in all three countries.
33.  Experience in South Asia varied.  For example, Nepal in the early 1990s had the
advantages of comfortable reserves, access to non-project aid and a transparent budgeting13
process, including reliable documentation of local  fund sources  and uses. In addition,
management capacity in the Treasury was adequate. To protect the development budget
while implementing fiscal reforms (including civil service and tax reforms) in the early
1990s, Nepal adopted a program which had provisions for contingent domestic borrowing
under specified conditions. The government could raise a specific  amount of additional
domestic credit beyond  initial targets, if the tax revenue benchmark  was being met; the
external  reserve position  remained comfortable;  and  the additional  local  funds were
required  to  support  high  quality  development  projects  with  good  implementation
performance acceptable to  the Treasury.  Subsequent political  instability  undermined
efforts to maintain these sound and innovative fiscal practices.
VII. Conclusion
34.  Focusing on local  financing gives new perspectives on the  issues of aid, fiscal
reform, and public  expenditure management.  First, fungibility  would not  necessarily
translate into resource flows to fill the local financing gap.  Project  aid may widen the
local financing gap because of the matching funds required to execute the investment, and
the recurrent financing necessary to operate it on completion.  For aid to augment local
financing of development directly, it has to be a non-project aid that can generate local
currency.  In the longer term, the effect of project aid on local financing lies in its impact
on growth and on expanding the base for tax revenues, seigniorage and borrowing.
35.  Second, when  local financing limits project  aid absorption,  it means that local
currency resources are more valuable than project aid at the margin.  The allocation of
local  funds becomes  important for  aid utilization  and aid productivity.  To  improve
overall efficiency in using public resources, including the allocation  and utilization of
local  funds, project  screening and public  expenditure reviews  need  to  pay  as much
attention to the quality of projects financed fully by local funds, as those funded by aid.
Resource shifts from fully locally-funded projects to aided projects to enhance the overall
quality of the public investment portfolio need to be given serious consideration. Where
governments find review of own-funded projects intrusive, attention could be focused on
strengthening local capacity in reviewing and managing the use of such local funds.
36.  Third, a  persistent local financing gap  complicates fiscal  reform programs.  A
fiscal  program  focused  on  matching  aggregate  expenditure  plans  against  aggregate
resources  and  glossing  over  the  inner  local  financing  gap  tends  to  undercut  the
availability of matching funds for projects, thereby limiting the absorption of project aid
and  the  implementation  of  the  development  budget.  In  the  short  term,  the  fiscal
authorities may reduce  capital formation and growth.  In the medium  term, they may
succumb to political pressure and compromise prudent fiscal  and  financial goals.  To
have a realistic scope  for sustained fiscal prudence, the local  financing  gap has to  be
confronted directly by matching planned local fund expenditures against expected local
fund receipts. Effective management of local funds requires a transparent  data base to
develop indicators and to monitor the allocation and utilization of local fund resources.14
APPENDIX  A
Macroeconomic Framework
Ys = Y(e, g)  (1)
Yd = C(Y-tY, m(Y), e)  (2)
LFs = L(Y, m(Y), e, t)  (3)
LFd = B  (4)
FFs = X(e)  (5)
FFd = F(Y, m(Y), e)  (6)
md = m(Y)  (7)
M = ER+D  (8)
e = E/P  (9)
g = P/W  (10)
m = M/P  (11)
1.  Output supply (Y) depends on foreign financing and local resources through the
real exchange rate (e) and the supply price per unit of labor cost (g).  Aggregate demand
(Yd) depends on income net of taxes, real money balances and the real exchange rate.  As
discussed  in  the text,  demand for  local  funds (LFd) depends  on  exogenous  factors,
especially population growth and pressure for social services. LFs, supply of local funds
to the governnent,  is influenced by the tax base (Y), the tax rate (t), money printing and
the real  exchange rate;  net domestic borrowing is assumed to be  nil.  The supply  of
foreign financing  (FFs) is influenced by exchange rate policy, and this determines both
exports  and  aid inflows.  Demand for foreign funds (FFd)  is  influenced by  income,
money balances and e. Money supply consists of reserves, ER, and domestic credit, D. E
is the nominal exchange rate in units of local currency, and R is reserves.  Real money
demand (md) depends on income. P is output price. W is the nominal wage rate.
2.  The excess demand functions for output, local funds and foreign financing  are
represented by H, I and J respectively in (12) to (14):
H = C(Y-tY, m(Y), e) - Y(e, g)  (12)
I = B - L(Y (e, g), m(Y), t)  (13)
J = F(Y, m(Y), e) - X(e)  (14)
3.  Differentiating (12) to (14) totally and imposing equilibrium conditions lead to
the equations  (15) to  (17).  Ye is the partial derivative of  Y with  respect to the  real
exchange rate;  Fm is the partial derivative of foreign financing with respect to  money
balances, and similarly for Yg, Xe, Ce, Cm, Ct, Cy, my, Lt, Le, Lm, Ly, Fe, Ct and Fy.
Output:  dY/de=(Ye+(Yg)dg/de+Y(Ct)dt/de-  Ce)/((Cm)my +Cy(l-t))  (15)15
Local Funds: dY/de = (dB/de -Le - (Lt)dt/de)/(Ly + (Lm)my)  (16)
Foreign Funds: dY/de = (Xe - Fe)/(Fy + (Fm)my)  (17)
4.  For output equilibrium in (15), dY/de >0, meaning yoyo and yy curves in Figure 1
will be  upward sloping.  In (15)  Ye >0 because devaluation is expected to  generate
positive  output response through correcting for price distortions, resource misallocation
and  under-employment,  and  the  relatively low  labor intensity  of production,  that  is
inherent  in  an  over-valued exchange rate.  Yg >0,  indicating a positive  supply price
response; dg/de >0, since increasing E must cause P to rise but less than proportionately
so that  e  would be  higher than before the exchange rate adjustment. Output  demand
responds negatively to e and positively to m and Y; thus, we have Ce <0; Cm >0; Cy >0.
5.  For local funds equilibrium in (16), dY/de <0; that is, 11  or lolo in Figure 1 will be
downward sloping.  dB/de = 0, since B is exogenous, but  dB/de <0 could be due to
increases in e leading P to rise and causing B to fall in real terms.  Ly >0; Le >0; my >0,
as real income growth expands the base increasing the supply of local funds through the
positive  effect of  devaluation on income and, therefore, tax revenues and  seigniorage.
Increases  in the tax rate and money balances impact positively on the supply of local
funds, that is, Lt >0, Lm >0; but dt/de = 0, the tax rate is independent of e.
6.  For foreign financing equilibrium in (17), dY/de may be positive  or negative.
Exchange rate depreciation will dampen demand for foreign financing, so that Fe <0; and
it will raise the supply of foreign funds, that is, Xe >0.  Increases in income will raise
money demand (my>0) and higher money growth may raise demand for imports and for
foreign financing (Fm>0); thus dY/de>0 in (17), meaning ff in Figure 1 will be upward
sloping.  On the other hand, increases in real money balances from output growth may
dampen demand for foreign exchange; that is, Fm <0, making the sign of (Fy + Fm.my)
in (17) ambiguous.  If Fy dominates (Fm)my, then dY/de >0 as noted earlier.  However,
if (Fm)my dominates Fy, then dY/de <0.  Reduced local fund expenditures would lower
output and money demand, putting pressure on demand for foreign currency, and this will
overwhelm the effect of the decline in output on imports and related foreign exchange
demand; the real exchange rate will have to rise to restore foreign financing balance.  The
equilibrium  curve of FF (ff or fofo in Figure 1) will be downward sloping, and will be
more elastic than that of the LF curve (11  or 1olo)  in Figure 1.16
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